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Risk Education for Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)



IMAS

International Mine Action Standards

Disclaimer:

The terminology presented in the TNMA has not been adopted by the IMAS Review Board, terms and definitions included, will be subject to revision in line with updates to IMAS 04.10 *“Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations”* – Updates expected July 2018

IMAS Secretary
19 June 2018

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Foreword

Management practices and operational procedures for mine action are constantly evolving. Improvements are made, and changes are required, to enhance safety and productivity. Changes may come from the introduction of new technology, in response to a new mine or UXO threat, and from field experience and lessons learned in other mine action projects and programmes. This experience and lessons learned should be shared in a timely manner.

Technical Notes for Mine Action (TN) provide a forum to share experience and lessons learned by collecting, collating and publishing technical information on important, topical themes, particularly those relating to safety and productivity. Technical Notes complement the broader issues and principles addressed in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

The preparation of Technical Notes follows a rapid production and approval process. They draw on practical experience and publicly-available information. Over time, some Technical Notes may be 'promoted' to become full IMAS standards, while others may be withdrawn if no longer relevant or if superseded by more up-to-date information.

Technical Notes are neither legal documents nor IMAS. There is no legal requirement to accept the advice provided in a Technical Note. They are purely advisory and are designed solely to supplement technical knowledge or to provide further guidance on the application of IMAS.

Technical Notes are compiled by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) at the request of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in support of the international mine action community. They are published on the IMAS website at www.mineactionstandards.org.

1. Scope

This Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA) is intended to provide guidance on additional factors to be considered when planning and conducting Risk Education (RE) for Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). It is not intended to be a replacement for existing guidelines for RE, such as International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 12.10. Rather it should be considered as complementary to the general principles set out in IMAS 12.10, and used to take account of certain factors that may present in places where IED have been (or are being used).

This TNMA is primarily concerned with the provision of RE on IED (IED RE) to the local population in affected countries. It is not primarily intended for the provision of safety and security training (referred to here as 'hazardous area environment training' (HEAT)) to the staff of international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGO) or other agencies working in affected countries. There are several organisations who specialise in such training and help on the provision of HEAT training can be sought from any of them. That being said, some of the principles set out in this Technical Note may be of use to organisations wishing to provide appropriate advice to their own personnel.

2. Terms and definitions

The terminology presented in the TNMA has not been adopted by the IMAS Review Board, terms and definitions included, will be subject to revision in line with updates to IMAS 04.10 "Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations" – Updates expected July 2018

2.1 Existing terms in mine action

In general, this TNMA will use terms that are in common usage in mine action, and as such can be found in IMAS 04.10 (Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations). Other relevant terms pertaining to IED can be found in the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) IED Lexicon, the first edition of which was published in 2016¹.

Two key definitions that are found in IMAS 04.10 are worth repeating here for ease of reference. These are:

3.137. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) (2013)

"a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components" (IATG 01.40:2011). Terminology under review by IMAS working group

3.186. Mine Risk Education (MRE) (2009)

"activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines/ERW by raising awareness of men, women, and children in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles and needs, and promoting behavioural change including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison".

IED, booby trap or improvised mines

In addition to the definition of IED above, a booby trap is defined as follows:

*"An explosive or non-explosive device, or other material, deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed"*²

¹ See mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/UNMAS%20IED%20Lexicon.pdf

² International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10

The 1997 anti-personnel landmine convention defined a mine thus:

“any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle”³

It can therefore be seen that these definitions overlap. A mine can be constructed in an improvised manner, or also placed in an unusual way likely to initiate if the victim conducts an apparently harmless act. Thus, these definitions can be considered as per the diagram at Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. How the definitions for IED, booby-trap and mine overlap. Thus, a victim-operated IED is also an improvised mine.

2.2 “Do no harm”

The following is extracted from a briefing on Conflict Sensitivity by the Collaborative for Development Action⁴:

“All aid programmes involve the transfer of resources (food, shelter, water, health care, training, etc.) into a resource-scarce environment. Where people are in conflict, these resources represent power and wealth and they become an element of the conflict. Some people attempt to control and use aid resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other side. If they are successful or if aid staff fail to recognise the impact of their programming decisions, aid can cause harm”.

³ 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (“Ottawa Convention”)

⁴ <http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/do-no-harm-local-capacities-for-peace-project/>

2.3 Specific terms

Two specific terms are introduced for the purposes of this TNMA. These are:

2.3.1 Active device **Terminology under review by IMAS working group**

The term 'active device' is used in this TNMA to describe any IED that are still under the effective control of the individual or group that deployed them, or where the local populations and relevant authorities in those locations do not wish to see them removed.

2.3.2 Legacy device **Terminology under review by IMAS working group**

The term 'legacy device' is used in this TNMA to describe any IED that are no longer under the effective control of the individual or group that deployed them, and where the local populations and relevant authorities in those locations wish to see them removed.

Any device that does not meet the definitions of a 'legacy device' should be considered as an 'active' device.

3. Purpose

This TNMA is intended to examine three key issues in the provision of IED RE in the light of the definitions and concepts set out above. These are:

- **The implications of 'do no harm' for IED RE**
- **The implications of 'Improvisation' for messaging content**
- **The implications of 'improvisation' for visual presentations**

All of these are discussed below.

This discussion is done to highlight the key differences for RE in the IED context compared to 'conventional' Mine Risk Education (MRE).

4. The Implications of 'do no harm' for IED RE

Firstly, it should be noted that, in this context, the word 'active' as set out above in Para 2.3.1, describes the degree to which a device is still 'in play'; it does not describe the life left in an electrical power source. This is a different concept than is commonly encountered in conventional humanitarian mine action, which is, in general, concerned with the clearance of 'explosive remnants of war' (ERW) and not weapons that are in the process of being used.

Thus, taking into account the concept of 'do no harm' as set out above in Para 2.2,' it can be seen that there is a significant risk that any agency attempting to intervene in an 'active' scenario is likely to violate the 'do no harm' principle, as they are interfering with the element of a conflict. This is likely to manifest itself as increased risk to the security of one (or both) of the following groups of stakeholders, as described below.

4.1 The intended beneficiaries

Three common elements of RE messaging are:

1. Don't go to contaminated areas

2. Don't touch items of ERW

3. Report any items of ERW found

Seen from a 'do no harm perspective,' there are risks to intended beneficiaries if IED RE messaging does not take account in the active/legacy status of the IED. This is particularly the case if an RE program tries to include the 'Report' element into its messaging. Organisations intending to undertake IED RE should consider the implications to the security of local populations being of they are being exhorted to report 'active' weapons. Anyone actually trying to report such a weapon to the authorities risks reprisals from those who planted the IED.

4.2 RE (and other agency) personnel

There are similar risks to the RE personnel who are attempting to present RE, especially where the 'Report' message is included. In such circumstances, the RE personnel (and potentially, by extension, other personnel in that agency) may be also be at risk from reprisals, as it may be felt that they are 'taking sides' with the security forces.

4.3 Managing risk to stakeholders

The circumstances that may apply in any one country, or even in any one community are very variable, and it is thus impossible to lay down any immutable advice on the best way to apply a principle of 'do no harm' and also continue to provide effective IED RE that is effective in modifying behaviour and hence reducing casualties. A more detailed risk assessment process is set out at Annex A to this TNMA. There are however a few alternatives that can be considered as examples. These include:

4.3.1 Modifying the report message

In some circumstances the use of a 'confidential hotline' might be sufficient to help with safe reporting. Alternatively, it may be appropriate, rather than advising beneficiaries to report suspected IED to the security forces, to suggest that they report any such items to their own community leaders, who may be better placed to identify alternative solutions.

4.3.2 Separating IED from standard Mine Risk Education (MRE) presentations (where applicable⁵)

One of the key differences between IED and other explosive ordnance, as mentioned above, is the fact that a degree of 'ownership' may apply to IED in a way that it does not apply to an explosive remnant of war (ERW). It might therefore be appropriate to keep conventional 'Mine' (and ERW) Risk Education (MRE) separate from IED RE. There is a precedent for this in small arms risk education (SARE), where there is a degree of potential for legal weapons ownership that is not present with ERW. International best practice recommends that SARE is thus kept separate from MRE, and this may also apply to IED RE (in the context of reporting), especially in the case of active weapons.

4.3.3 Use of indirect RE methodologies

A third risk management strategy – particularly for the implementing agency - is to carry out the RE activities indirectly⁶. This could be by the use of mass media campaigns or by the use of local partners. Both of these approaches have advantages and disadvantages. For example, it is far harder

⁵ See the risk assessment process at Annex A.

⁶ This may include, for example, implementing agencies not including their own names or logos in IED RE messaging. In any case it will be appropriate for the relevant national authority to 'own' the messaging.

to estimate the number of direct beneficiaries from mass media campaigns than to count the number of people who turn up to an RE presentation in a community.

5. The implications of ‘Improvisation’ for messaging content

As happened for conventional MRE, IED RE is evolving from its original military roots. In the early days of MRE, considerable time and energy was spent on presenting detailed facts about the names, functioning mechanisms and even explosive content of various types of mines, before it was eventually accepted that such detailed information was unnecessary and detracted from the main messaging requirement (as stated above: ‘don’t go. don’t touch, report’).

The same has been seen in the early days of IED RE. Because of the improvised nature of IED they do not have standard designs or containers, and trainers providing IED awareness training to peacekeepers or other security providers, it is not unknown to train these personnel on IED components as a common factor in the multitude of designs of IED that are encountered. Whilst this is entirely appropriate for security providers, it is suggested that this is not the most useful focus of information for more general humanitarian purposes. As was realised for MRE, it can be said that “if you can see this you are too close” when considering its relevance for most beneficiaries.

5.1 Emphasising safe behaviour

In MRE, the concept of ‘minefield indicators’ became more useful once it was realised that the key to reducing casualties was the modification of behaviour. In the context of IED RE, it is suggested that, as for MRE, providing information on patterns of use will be of more use – thus emphasising safe behaviour messages – than providing spurious detail on the construction of IED. The key to this is perhaps the concept that is also very common in IED search training, namely to be alert for “the presence of the abnormal or the absence of the normal”. However, unlike MRE, the patterns of IED use tend to be more varied between countries, and may even change fluidly over time in any particular country. Hence, there is a need for strong injury surveillance system that include IED-related injuries and more detailed, country-specific needs assessment than in conventional RE program design. The needs assessment process should also be flexible enough to allow reviews as patterns of IED use change.

6. The implications of ‘improvisation’ for visual presentations

One of the most common methods for transmitting information in conventional RE is visual, particularly through use of posters of mines and ERW. As can be seen in the definition of IED quoted above, one of the key attributes of IED is that they are improvised. Also, unlike conventional ERW, IED use their containers often to disguise their true nature. In recent years, one of the most prevalent containers for IED is a simple plastic canister, often referred to as a ‘yellow palm oil container’. So prevalent are these that some IED search and disposal trainers even refer to them by their acronym, ‘YPOC’. Nevertheless, however common they are as IED containers, it is still a fact that most YPOC encountered are *not* IED containers, and it is commonly understood that the only limit to IED construction – and their containment in particular – is the imagination of the builder. Thus, providing extensive pictures of containers that might contain IED is often irrelevant. Furthermore, such an approach could be counter-productive in either (a) encouraging large numbers of false alarms or (b) damaging the credibility of the RE material. Furthermore, the fluidity of IED use is such that, even if an RE poster campaign accurately portrayed (for example) YPOC as the main containment for a particular bombing campaign, there would be very little obstacle to the IED builders changing their preferred container much faster than it would be possible to replace poster sets.

6.1 Alternatives to relying on pictures of items: other images

There are a number of alternatives to relying on pictures of items. As above, these will depend on a thorough understanding of the practices carried out by those who deploy IED. It will not be sufficient to print out and point at posters. For example, it should be possible to build on the emphasis of 'safer behaviour' as discussed above. Thus IED RE program designers should seek to understand under what circumstances IED are employed and present images of those circumstances (similar to presentation of 'mine indicators' in MRE) and then providing images of actions to avoid such circumstances (i.e. 'safe behaviour' advice). Indeed, there was such a switch by many MRE providers to emphasising of 'mine indicators' instead of relying on pictures of landmines (most of which would be buried in any case).

6.2 Alternatives to relying on pictures of items: other traditions

There is also a potential for the use of other, traditional, means of providing knowledge. Many cultures have a history of oral traditions, and IED RE program designers should investigate the potential for harnessing such methods. Story-telling can easily be combined with pictures of safe behaviour, for example. Another variation on this technique could be a greater emphasis on the use of radio, or, at least, borrowing from radio techniques. Writers for radio have, inevitably, to rely on mental images in a medium where it is simply impossible to rely on pictures.

7. 'Training of Trainer' requirements

It can be seen from the issues laid out that there is additional 'training the trainer' requirements for engaging in safe and effective IED RE. It is not sufficient to provide existing MRE trainers with a few more posters for them to point at. The following additional training requirements are suggested as a minimum: individual circumstances may require more training. However, as for conventional MRE, there is no need to provide detailed technical training on how IED work, so exhaustive training on the components and construction of IED should be avoided – except where these are relevant to more technical C-IED training outside of the scope of this TNMA. Suggested minimum additional knowledge requirements are set out in bullet point format below.

7.1 Circumstances of use

- Defining IED
- How IED tend to be used in the affected country.

7.2 IED Indicators

- Particularly for roads and buildings.
- Include the 'absence of the normal and the presence of the abnormal'

7.3 Introduction of different types of IED

- Break down by time/victim/command.
- Include familiarity with IED acronyms (VOIED, VBIED etc.)
Terminology under review by IMAS working group
- Do not include too much technical detail.

7.4 Concept of active/legacy

- Explain the concepts of active/legacy and their implications for IED RE **Terminology under review by IMAS working group**

- **Point out similarities and differences with conventional MRE**
- **Explain that the “don’t touch don’t go” messages remain relevant.**
 - **Explain the reporting issues where these are relevant**

7.5 Risk assessment and analysis

- **Fully involve RE trainers in the risk assessment process as part of their training, so that they are comfortable with the conclusions.**
- **Explain the need to be aware of their own safety and that this is a core part of the approach being taken**
- **Explain how to introduce the subject to local communities and leaders, and seek local approval of the training before it is provided, especially in ‘active’ scenarios.**
- **Do NOT try to run IED RE together with MRE sessions where there is an active threat, because of the potential ‘ownership’ issues with active IED, unless a risk assessment has been completed. See Annex A.**

Annex A

(Informative)

Risk assessment and risk analysis processes for IED program or project design

Risk Assessment

The risk assessment and risk analysis processes are captured in the flow chart set out at Annex B. The individual steps are described here.

a) Assessing the status of the IED

If the area (or indeed the country) is no longer subjected to an ongoing IED campaign, then any IED left behind can be considered to be a 'legacy' IED as defined in this TNMA. In such circumstances, there may be no particular additional risk to the implementing agency from including IED RE within its RE activities in that area (or country).

b) Assessing the nature of the IED threat

Using the definitions/descriptions above, it should be possible to determine whether the (bulk of the) problem is with booby traps and/or improvised mines or with command detonated IED. If it is the former, then again IED RE can usually be conducted as part of a standard RE session.

c) Assessing the target

In general, there are three main target groups for IED. These are discussed below

- 1. If the main target is the Security Forces (SF), no action is usually necessary for humanitarian organisations to provide IED RE to the SF, as they will certainly have their own Counter-IED (C-IED) and IEDD capacities available. There may be a need to address the needs of population groups that are otherwise at risk from being 'in the wrong place at the wrong time' (i.e. "collateral damage") which can be considered as an issue of promoting safer behaviour.**
- 2. If the main target is international organisations and/or NGO, these organisations will likely have their own risk assessment or minimum operating security standards (MOSS), and this will guide them on the correct safety and security actions they should take. The best way for their staff to be given 'situational awareness' in such high-risk areas is for them to be given HEAT training. These courses provide far more comprehensive training than can be offered in any single RE session (indeed, a HEAT course can be expected to include an RE session).**

3. If there is an active IED threat, and the main target is the civilian population, then there may still be a possibility for humanitarian intervention in the form of IED RE, but in this circumstance additional steps must also be undertaken in the form of a risk analysis. These additional steps are set out below.

Risk Analysis

This risk analysis process focuses on two key questions that are particularly relevant if the first part of the risk assessment has determined that command-detonated IED are being used to target the civilian population.

d) Risk implementations for the agency

The first question is “are there any risk implications for the implementing agency?” This focuses on whether or not there is any credible chance that the provision of IED RE, will, under the current circumstances, highlight the agency as a provider of advice that is intended to counter the aims of the terrorists/insurgent group emplacing the IED. This question must not be considered by the agency’s project team in isolation, but should include all relevant stakeholders, including any local security coordination system and any local mine action centre (including UN mine action teams where present).

e) Assessing the significance of any additional risks

The second question is then whether this will make any difference. If the implementing agency are already targets, the stakeholders may decide that there is no significant **additional** risk incurred by proceeding with the IED RE training.

The circumstances will vary from country-to-country and even regionally and over time, as it is impossible to set out all possible permutations in a global advisory document such as a TNMA. For example, it may be felt that, in particular circumstances, IED RE training can proceed, but specific reference to reporting active IED should be omitted if this were to place the local population (or the agency team) at risk.


Detailed questions

Examples of detailed questions to help support the risk assessment and risk analysis processes are set out at Annex C. It is recommended that the questions at Annex C are used first as part of a risk survey, and the answers gained from the questionnaire then used in turn to help navigate the flow chart at Annex B.

Annex B

(Informative) Terminology under review by IMAS working group

An example of an IED RE Risk Assessment Flow Chart



Annex C

(Informative)

Example research questions for IED RE risk assessment/analysis

Step One: The risk assessment process

1. General IED situation

The following questions are intended to complement a general security/mine action briefing on the IED situation in country.

Supplementary questions

	Question	Explanation	How can the question be answered?
1.1	How does the prevalence of IED use compare to that of conventional weapons?	Compile evidence to support the argument that IED use is significant.	Analysis of IMSMA data, injury surveillance systems and other data collection mechanisms (e.g. Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations affecting children)
1.2	Which are the armed opposition groups (AOG) or Security Force entities that are known to use IED in the country context?	It is important to identify the different AOGs or armed forces that use IEDs, because they will not all be using them in the same way. The subsequent analysis should be carried out keeping in mind the different AOG and how that impacts upon the other research questions.	Mapping of different parties to the conflict; People with Knowledge (PwK) interviews; secondary data research
1.3	Why are armed groups/SF using IED?	IED can be used for different reasons e.g. to create terror amongst the local population; to challenge State control of certain areas; in cases where AOG do not have access to conventional weapons; as a substitute of small arms; as command-detonated devices to secure SF positions	PwK interviews; secondary data research
1.4	Who is currently involved in counter-IED efforts in the country context?	It is important to identify who is already working on counter-IED efforts in country, and the scope of their activities	Mapping of different state, commercial, security providers, UN and NGO actors involved in counter-IED

1.5	What is the scope of their activities?	The agency should aim to supplement not duplicate activities of other actors, depending on the need.	
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2. Is the status of the IED threat active or legacy?

The risk implications of engaging in IED data-collection or awareness are significant in a context where the IED threat is considered to be active. Therefore using the working definitions outlined in Para 2, it is essential to carefully analyse available data to assess whether the IED threat is active or legacy. This analysis shall be carried out at a national but also more local level as the context requires.

Supplementary questions

	Question	Explanation	How can the question be answered?
2.1	Can the IEDs be considered to be “owned” by any party to the conflict?	If the IEDs are still considered to be “owned” then they are active.	Write up of the analysis of PwK interviews and secondary research
2.2	Is there any current intended target for the IEDs?	If there is a current intended target for the IEDs then they are considered active.	PwK interviews
2.3	Are there differences between geographic locations in-country in terms of whether the IEDs can be considered active or legacy?	If the threat is active in one location, but legacy in another, it is possible to consider IED awareness activities in the areas where the device are found to be legacy.	IED maps

3. What is the nature of the IED threat?

Using the working definitions described previously, an analysis should be carried out to determine whether the bulk of the problem is with booby-traps and/or improvised mines or with command detonated IED.

Supplementary questions

	Question	Explanation	How can the question be answered?
3.1	What is the overall # of incidents involving IEDs in-country?	This should include data for all types of IED to give the scale of the problem overall.	If available, the data should be provided for IED use over time. Ideally it should be disaggregated by year to show whether IED use is increasing or decreasing.

			Sources of information include: INSO weekly report, IMSMA data, national injury surveillance systems, internal incident mapping etc
3.2	What % of these incidents is reported to have involved command detonated IED?	It is important to provide evidence of what the nature of the IED threat is as it impacts on the course of action that the agency shall take. For command-detonated IED	Provide analysis and charts of any recent data to demonstrate the % of different types of device being used.
3.3	What % of these incidents is reported to have involved improvised mines (victim operated IED)?	It is important to provide evidence of what the nature of the IED threat is as it impacts on the course of action that the implementing agency shall take. In the case of improvised mines (these can be integrated into traditional MRE sessions, but evidence is needed to support this decision.	Sources of information include: INSO weekly report, IMSMA data, internal incident mapping etc If there is not good quality data available on the nature of IED use this should be noted in the analysis.
3.4	What % of these incidents is reported to have involved booby traps (victim operated IED)?	It is important to provide evidence of what the nature of the IED threat is as it impacts on the course of action that the implementing agency shall take. In the case of legacy booby traps, these can be integrated into traditional MRE sessions, but evidence is needed to support this decision.	
3.5	Are there differences between geographic locations in-country in terms of whether the device used are victim-operated or command detonated?	If the threat is active in one location, but legacy in another, it may be necessary to consider different types of IED awareness activities in the areas where the device are found to be legacy	IED maps; INSO data; IMSMA data Sources of information include: INSO weekly report, IMSMA data, internal incident mapping etc

4. Who is the intended target of command-detonated IED attacks?

It is important to provide evidence on whom the primary target of IED attacks is as it impacts on the course of action that the implementing agency shall take.

Supplementary questions

Question	Explanation	How can the question
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			be answered?
4.1	Why would government agencies be targeted with IED?	We need to understand the logic behind why one group or another is targeted.	
4.2	Which government agencies are most likely to be attacked?	In complex security environments, we need to know which government agencies are most likely to be targeted.	
4.3	What % of IED attacks are targeted at government agencies?	In the case that most attacks target government agencies, there may be no need for a humanitarian implementing agency to provide IED awareness.	Provide analysis of any recent data to demonstrate the % of attacks against different targets. Sources of data include: INSO weekly report, IMSMA database etc
4.4	Why would security forces be targeted with IED?	We need to understand the logic behind why one group or another is targeted.	
4.5	Which security forces are most likely to be attacked?	In complex security environments, we need to know which government agencies are most likely to be targeted.	
4.6	What % of IED attacks are targeted at the security forces?	In the case that most attacks target security forces, there is no need for a humanitarian RE implementing agency to provide IED awareness. They should have their own counter-IED capacity and training.	
4.7	Why would the international community be targeted with IED?	We need to understand the logic behind why one group or another is targeted.	
4.8	Which representatives of the international community are most likely to be targeted?	In complex security environments, we need to know which representatives of the international community are most likely to be targeted. For example is it the UN, peacekeeping missions, embassies, NGO etc...?	
4.9	What % of IED attacks are targeted at embassies, UN agencies or NGO?	In the case that most attacks target embassies, UN agencies or NGO, the agency can provide "risk education for humanitarian workers".	
4.10	Why would the civilian population be targeted with IED?	It is necessary to understand the logic behind why one group or another is targeted.	

4.11	What % of IED attacks are targeted at the civilian population?	In the case that most attacks target embassies, UN agencies or NGOs, an implementing agency might be able to provide IED awareness. However, additional steps must also be undertaken in the form of a risk analysis.	
4.12	What % of casualties of IED attacks are civilian or military?	Civilians may not be the primary target of IED attacks, but they often represent the highest # of casualties from being in the wrong place at the wrong time (“collateral damage”). The implementing agency might be able to provide IED awareness in these circumstances, but additional steps must also be undertaken in the form of a risk analysis.	

5. What are the common tactics of IED use?

Supplementary questions

	Question	Explanation	How can the question be answered?
5.1	What are the most common tactics used for IED attacks?	It is necessary to understand the most common tactics for IED use e.g. as part of a complex attack; VBIED parked in a crowded market; RCIED at the roadside detonated as a military vehicle passes, etc	Provide analysis of any recent data to demonstrate the % of attacks against different targets. Sources of data include: INSO weekly report, IMSMA database etc
5.2	Are there any differences in tactic, depending on whom the target is?		
5.3	Are there any particular places that are most commonly targeted?	It is necessary need to understand if there are any specific places where people are most at risk of being killed or injured during IED attacks	
5.4	What are the common indicators of IED?		

5.5	What are the common indicators of an imminent IED attack?	We need to know if there are any context-specific signs that an attack is about to take place. In some cases these are quite distinct (e.g. an empty market on market day), but in other cases they are not	
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6. What is the impact of IED on the civilian population?

Supplementary questions

	Question	Explanation	How can the question be answered?
6.1	What % of overall IED casualties represents the civilian population?	This helps to provide evidence for the extent to which the civilian population are at risk from IED.	
6.2	How does the number of civilian casualties from IEDs compare to that of those from conventional weapons?	This will provide evidence of whether IED or conventional weapons have greater humanitarian impact.	
6.3	What are the common scenarios in which civilians are killed or injured during IED attacks?	This helps to understand whether it is i) as bystanders who are killed in the initial blast; ii) being caught in gunfire following an explosion; iii) being caught in a secondary blast etc	Provide analysis of any recent data to demonstrate the % of attacks against different targets.
6.4	Are there any specific places where the local population are most at risk from IED attacks? Why?	In some countries where civilians are the direct targets, they will typically be most at risk in places such as markets, moto parks, restaurants, mosques, churches etc. It is necessary to understand what these places are in the country context.	Sources of data include: INSO weekly report, IMSMA, Injury surveillance systems, database etc
6.5	How do IED impact on people's daily lives?	It is important to understand what coping strategies (if any) are already adopted	
6.6	What are the common behaviours of the local population if in the proximity of an IED attack?	In some instances the behaviour of the local population in the immediate aftermath of an attack can increase their exposure to risk. For example, often people run to assist victims of an initial blast and are then caught up in a secondary blast.	
6.7	What can be done to reduce the vulnerability of the civilian population to	It is important to gather information and ideas on how this vulnerability can be reduced. It is also important to gauge interest in IED awareness	

	the IED threat?	sessions.	
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7. What is the impact of IED on the humanitarian community?

	Question	Explanation	How can the question be answered?
7.1	What % of overall IED casualties represents the humanitarian community?	This helps to provide evidence for the extent to which the humanitarian community are at risk from IED	
7.2	What are the common scenarios in which the international community are most at risk of IED attacks?	This helps to understand whether it is i) as bystanders who are killed in the initial blast; ii) being caught in gunfire following an explosion; iii) being caught in a secondary blast etc	Provide analysis of any recent data to demonstrate the % of attacks against different targets. Sources of data include: INSO weekly report, IMSMA database etc
7.3	Are there any specific places where humanitarian workers are most at risk of IED attacks?	In some countries where civilians are the direct targets, they will typically be most at risk in places such as restaurants, mosques, churches etc. It is necessary to understand what these places are in the country context.	
7.4	How does the IEDs threat impact on the delivery of humanitarian assistance and services?	There are many possible effects, such as increased security costs, fear of attacks at distribution points etc. It is necessary to understand from the perspective of assistance providers what those effects are.	
7.5	Are there any specific examples that you can share?		
7.6	To what extent is the staff of humanitarian organisations equipped with the knowledge and skills to work in contexts where IED are a significant threat?	What safety training has been given? How relevant or accurate is it?	
7.7	What can be done to reduce the vulnerability of humanitarian organisations and their staff to the IED threat?	It is important to gather information and ideas on how this vulnerability can be reduced. It is also important to gauge interest in risk education for humanitarian workers.	

Step Two: The risk analysis process

Note: the conclusions drawn from this risk analysis process will be very dependent on the individual agency's willingness to accept risk. These notes are for guidance only.

8. What are the risk implications of engaging in IED awareness for the Implementing agency?

Supplementary questions

	Question	Explanation	How can the question be answered?
8.1	Who is currently involved in counter-IED efforts in-country and what are the challenges that they have faced?	It is necessary to know if other agencies involved in counter-IED have become targets for AOG because of the work that they are carrying out. If they have then the risk-implication for the implementing agency as an organisation is high.	
8.2	In general, how will the provision of IED RE affect the implementing agency status as neutral and impartial? What could be the result of that?	Any involvement in counter-IED could be perceived as taking sides in the conflict	
8.3	How will the government perceive the involvement of the implementing agency in the provision of IED RE?	In many countries, counter-IED efforts are typically dealt with by state entities. Any effort by the implementing agency to engage in IED RE may therefore not be well received and could result in negative consequences for the organisation.	Provide analysis of any recent data to demonstrate the % of attacks against different targets.
8.4	How will security providers perceive the involvement of an International organisation/NGO in the provision of IED RE?		Sources of data include: INSO weekly report, IMSMA database etc
8.5	How will AOG and militias perceive the involvement of an INGO in provision of IED RE	The perception that humanitarian organizations are affiliated with the State entities counter-IED efforts would call into question the neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organization involved and could result in the organization and its staff being considered as legitimate targets for attack by AOG.	

8.6	Is the provision of IED awareness going to highlight the implementing agency as a provider of advice that is intended to counter the aims of AOG?	Again, this could result in the organization and its staff being considered as legitimate targets for attack by AOG.	
8.7	What are the implications for the work of the other projects/programs by the implementing agency?		
8.8	What are the risk implications for the national staff of the implementing agency?	National staff usually live and work in affected communities. Out of duty of care it is necessary to be sure that provision of IED RE is not going to expose them to risk of i) retribution from AOG, or ii) detention by state actors.	
8.9	How can the risks for national staff be mitigated?	It is important to identify any precautions the implementing agency can take to avoid causing harm to national staff.	
8.10	In cases where the implementing agency is already considered a target, will provision of IED RE incur significant additional risk?	In some working contexts, the implementing agency may already be considered a target. It is necessary to assess whether provision of IED RE will increase the likelihood of being attacked.	
8.11	Please describe any examples from the country you work in of where IED RE has been tried by another organisation and i) been successful, ii) failed. What were the reasons for this?		

9. What are the risk implications of participating in IED awareness for members of the community?

Supplementary questions

	Question	Explanation	How can the question be answered?
9.1	How will community members participating in IED RE	At the community level, anyone who is known or suspected to have	Local community leaders

	sessions be viewed by the government and security providers?	participated in an IED RE session could be viewed as a member of an AOG by government and security providers so could be at risk of detention.	
9.2	How can we mitigate these risks?	It is important to identify any precautions the implementing agency can take to avoid causing harm to the local population at the hands of security providers.	
9.3	How will community members participating in IED RE sessions be viewed by AOG and militias?	At the community level, anyone who is known or suspected to have participated in an IED RE session could be viewed as an informant by an AOG, so would be at risk of retribution.	
9.4	How can we mitigate these risks?	It is important to identify any precautions the implementing agency can take to avoid causing harm to the local population at the hands of AOG and militias.	
9.5	How would asking people to report suspected IED be perceived?	In some countries there may be widespread agreement amongst some communities with those placing the IED, In others, there may be a fear that revenge will be taken against people reporting IED. Will a confidential hotline number be effective?	

Amendment record

Management of Technical Notes amendments

Technical Notes (TN) are subject to review on an 'as required' basis. As amendments are made to this TN they will be given a number, and the date and general details of the amendment shown in the table below. The amendment will also be shown on the cover page of the TN by the inclusion under the version date of the phrase 'incorporating amendment number(s) 1 etc.'

As reviews of TN are made new versions may be issued. Amendments up to the date of the new version will be incorporated into the new version and the amendment record table cleared. Recording of amendments will then start again until a further version is produced.

The most recently amended TN will be the versions that are posted on the IMAS website at www.mineactionstandards.org

Number	Date	Amendment Details